This does not recognize that the main part of the problem is the illicit trafficking in military small arms, which cannot be dealt with successfully by administrative means. It must be dealt with by recognizing the activity as being criminal, and dealing with it by making sure that the activity is defined as criminal in every nation. Then it can be dealt with by treating it as what it is--an activity of organized crime, sometimes with the complicity of one or more national governments. This of course has to except the legitimate activities of a "people."
21. Convinced of the need for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security,
22. Resolve therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects by:
- Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional and national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;
- Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons;
- Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently;
- Mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to prevent and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all their aspects, to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character and seriousness of the interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these weapons;
- Promoting responsible action by States with a view to preventing the illicit export, import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons.
II. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects
1. We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind the different situations, capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects:
2. To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.
Section 2 is a contradiction in itself. Putting in place "adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons" cannot and will not "prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients." How could it? The "illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms" is already in violation of existing "laws, regulations and administrative procedures," so more of the same remedy is as unlikely to be effective as the previous "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" were.
3. To adopt and implement, in the States that have not already done so, the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such activities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.
Section 3 is a little better. However, in most nations that are capable of producing sophisticated military small arms, etc., such laws are already in place. This proposal also does not cover the problem of stockpiles contained in bonded warehouses that are not officially in the nation. It seems unlikely that Britain is the only nation with that interesting situation.
4. To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.
Section 4 is another contradiction in itself. It proposes to control international criminal activity by establishing a network of government-employed administrators trying to do work that properly belongs to the police of the nation. The "illicit trade in small arms and light weapons" is illicit. Therefore, the seeking of malefactors and the prosecution of malefactors is a police function, not something that can or should be done by government-employed administrators. The writer suggests that this approach is futile. It is time to take a look at how the actual transfer of illicit arms actually takes place:
The Libyan and Criminal Connections with the Irish Republican Army
State sponsorship of terrorism has become one of the most worrying trends in international terrorism. The willingness of certain states, and terrorist organizations that form or support the governments in several nations, to support terrorist and/or criminal groups has changed the complexion of world politics. War has fundamentally changed, as such states have now the facility to wage clandestine proxy wars anywhere in the world.
The ability to wage war by proxy through an international network of criminal and/or terrorist organizations is a new factor in U.N. relationships between states.
A fairly recent and obvious example of state sponsorship of a terrorist group aimed at damaging another nation has been the Libyan support of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA's express aim is to overturn the expressed desire of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.
The apparent reason for a Libyan desire to damage Britain was revenge for its support of U.S. actions against Libya, including the bombing of Tripoli. The campaign against Britain and the U.S. also included the Lockerbie bombing of a civilian airliner in flight.
Under Scottish law two Libyans were accused, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Fhimah. While Fhimah was declared innocent, Megrahi was found guilty. The judges said they had no doubt that Megrahi had planted the bomb, but declined to rule on why he had done it.
The IRA has apparently been continuously supplied with weapons and money coming from Libya for nearly a quarter of a century. In 1973, the ship Claudia, with five tonnes of illicit arms on board, was intercepted by Irish police in Waterford Bay. In 1987, French authorities intercepted another ship, the Eksund, with a massive 150 tonnes of weapons on board. The weapons included 1000 Romanian-made AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, a million rounds of ammunition for them, SAM-7 ground-to-air shoulder-fired homing missiles, and 1,000 "mortar bombs" and RPG-7 or RPG-9 rocket-propelled grenades. There were other SALW present also, but those were the most worrying items.
Writer's note: It is unclear whether the "mortar bombs" were actually mortar bombs, or whether they were projectiles for RPG-7 and/or RPG-9 rocket launchers.
In July 1992, the then chief police officer in Northern Ireland, Sir Hugh Annesley, estimated Libyan shipments successfully delivered to the IRA before 1987 to include at least:
6 tonnes of Semtex plastic explosive,
1,500 AK assault rifles,
3 Russian DShK 12.7X108mm heavy machine guns,
Taurus 9mm semi-automatic pistols from Brazil,
1.5 million rounds of ammunition,
20 SAM-7 ground-to-air shoulder-fired homing missiles,
50 RPG-7 rocket launchers, and
10 flamethrowers.
It is not known whether that illicit transfer of military small arms and light weapons to IRA terrorists was ordered by the Libyan head of state, or by some more junior person acting with or without official sanction. It is highly unlikely that an investigation of existing records in Libya will produce a correct and honest answer, or that the records mandated by the Programme of Action will do any better in the foreseeable future.
Those deadly consignments were delivered through Irish waters, successfully landed on the coast of the Republic of Ireland, and are apparently stored to this day in bunkers somewhere within the Republic of Ireland.
Chronology of IRA-destination Gun-running, 1972 to 1987
1972: The weapons shipments from Libya began in 1972 with two cargoes containing an estimated 500 rifles, 500 pistols, 40,000 rounds of ammunition, an unknown amount of Semtex plastic explosive, plus assorted grenades, anti-tank mines, fuses and other equipment.
1973: A third shipment on board the 300-ton MV Claudia was intercepted off Helvick Head, County Waterford, in March. On board the Naval Service found 250 rifles, 243 pistols, 850 magazines, 100 anti-tank mines, 500 grenades, Semtex plastic explosive, TNT, primers, electric detonators and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. This shipment apparently was loaded on the vessel in Libya.
1977-78: A further seven tons of weapons, including an unknown number of RPG-7 rocket-launchers, rifles, explosives, handguns and ammunition, apparently reached the IRA from Libya.
1984: The County Kerry based trawler Marita Ann was intercepted by the Irish Naval Service near the Skellings, off the Kerry coast. There were seven tons of arms on board, including a .50 calibre Browning machine gun, 300 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. These weapons had apparently come from an organized crime gang in Boston. It should be noted that shipments of arms by organized criminal gangs also cannot be controled by administrative methods, as they involve no conventional documentation.
Note: This batch of illicit military small arms was sent to the IRA through a long-standing IRA connection to the American Mafia. It seems unlikely that there were any written records that would have been affected by the Programme of Action.
Shipments of military small arms that originate as illicit shipments from criminal gangs or illicit shipments from official agents or unofficial agents of a national government obviously do not go through the regular channels where control can be exerted by the rules fostered by the Programme of Action.
1985: In August, the 65-foot fishing boat Casamara, delivered the first of three shipments of weapons that apparently came from Libya. The largest shipment ever intercepted to that date, it included 1,000 AK-47 rifles, 10 DShK 38-46 12.7X108mm anti-aircraft machineguns, one million rounds of ammunition and one million "mortar bombs." That shipment was surpassed by the Eksund shipment in 1987.
Note: Again, these "mortar bombs" may be RPG-7 or RPG-9 rocket projectiles, and probably were. The RPG-7 or -9 is more useful to a terrorist than a mortar.
This first 10-ton shipment included 50 boxes containing rifles, pistols and rocket-launchers. In October the Casamara apparently delivered another 10 to 14 tons of weapons, including several 12.7X108mm heavy machine guns.
1986: In April between 14 and 20 tons of weaponry, including Semtex and at least two SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles, arrived in Ireland in a small vessel.
1986: A larger vessel, the Villa, was used to deliver between 80 and 90 tons of weapons, including at least seven RPG-7 or RPG-9 rocket launchers, 10 SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles and a large quantity of Semtex.
1986: A shipment of 17 rifles, two handguns, grenades, 70,000 rounds of ammunition and four drums of the chemical nitrobenzene (used for manufacturing explosives) was intercepted in Amsterdam.
1987: In October the Eksund was intercepted by a French naval fast patrol boat in the Bay of Biscay. The Eksund was carrying 150 tons of weapons, including 1,000 AK-47 rifles, 10 DShK 12.7X108mm anti-aircraft machine guns, one million rounds of ammunition and one million "mortar bombs."
Note: Again, the "mortar bombs" may have been RPG-7 or RPG-9 projectiles. The figure for quantity of "mortar bombs" seems much too high, is probably the result of confused reporting, and is almost certainly inaccurate.
Financing International Terror
Some (British) £6.75 million in cash was apparently given to the IRA, which turned the IRA into one of the world's wealthiest insurgent organizations. Much of that money has since been sunk into investments. IRA financiers have apparently quadrupled the value of Libyan cash received. Not all of the money was spent on the armed struggle. Much of it was invested in property, businesses and offshore accounts on the Channel Islands. These have grown over the past decade into a rich investment portfolio. The booming Irish economy, fuelled by rock-bottom interest rates, European Union subsidies, and a fast-growing high-technology sector, has apparently turned the IRA into a thriving corporate enterprise with a turnover to rival some of Ireland's biggest companies. That raises further problems of intelligence and control.
The situation is much more complex than most people think it is. Simplistic thinking produces simplistic "solutions"--that unfortunately do not work.
It should be noted that there is close and continuing cooperation between terrorist groups, "liberation armies," and purely criminal organizations. One strange new practice is the stealing of art objects (usually paintings) too valuable to find sale in any legitimate marketplace. The media reported, for example, that two stolen Vermeers (one stolen from Russborough House in Ireland, and one from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston, Maryland) were valued at over $100 million each. Such items cannot be sold back into the legitimate art trade, as they are far too recognizable. With that provenance, and the values established by media reports, they were used as collateral for illegal loans by the criminals who stole them.
Part of the loot from Russborough House turned up in Turkey, where it was taken by an Ulster Volunteer Force representative, apparently as part of a scheme to acquire illicit military small arms.
This intersection of the illicit arms trade and the illicit art trade is made more interesting by the fact that money was raised by the criminal gang that stole it "pawning" the Russborough Vermeer to a dealer in illicit diamonds. The money raised by that operation was apparently intended to finance the purchase of a very large shipment of illegal drugs. The drugs, once sold at huge profit, would have generated the money necessary to redeem the "pawned" Vermeer from the illicit diamond dealer who advanced the sum of one million British pounds to the criminal gang responsible for the theft. This entire area--illegal art, guns, diamonds, and drugs--is, today, solidly braided together.
The financial transactions in the matter described above were quite complex, and included the purchase of a bank in Antigua by the criminal gang for the purpose of laundering money. The whole scheme required the national police forces that became involved to make a complex map of the movement of art, arms, drugs, and money to and from Oslo, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Antwerp, Istanbul, Limassol, Marbella, Antigua, Dublin, the Isle of Man, and London, England.
All of this activity, of course, was illegal activity that generated no paper records that could used to control the activities of the criminals and terrorist insurgents involved. Administrative solutions are inappropriate for controlling such activities.
From this, it is, the writer believes, obvious that control of the illegal arms trade requires major improvements to international police intelligence gathering capabilities, international police cooperation, and international coordinated actions by national and international police. Because the weapons involved are military small arms, military involvement is often required, if only to identify the types of arms and ensure that the arms are in a safe condition. The "administrative solution" proposed by the U.N. Programme of Action is much too simplistic to be even slightly useful in this complex area. In the writer's opinion, the Programme of Action is largely an exercise in futility.
5. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of contact to act as liaison between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.
It is suggested that the correct "national point of contact" is between the representatives of the nations at Interpol. It is further suggested that Interpol needs significant increases in both funding and staff. Interpol also needs a clear mandate to investigate and deal with illicit trafficking in military small arms and light weapons.
6. To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in the illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit small arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against such groups and individuals.
Section 6 again is describing a police function, and apparently trying to suggest that police operations can and should be carried out by government-employed administrators. This adopted principle is probably a main reason why the Programme of Action has had few if any successes in several years of operation.
7. To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each weapon.
Section 7 exhibits a remarkable lack of understanding of the world problem with illicit military small arms. The military small arms used in brushfire wars, rebellions, and large-scale criminal activity are rarely new. They are commonly obsolete or obsolescent military small arms that have been moved from country to country, or within a country, with no documentation whatever--as described in this writer's preamble. Frequently the sequence runs this way: First, a nation determines that a small arm used by its armed forces is obsolete, and replaces it with new military small arms. The obsolete military small arms are then sold cheaply to another government often a government that has deep problems with criminal gangs or a "liberation army." Such a government is often unable to prevent the movement of the used military small arms from legitimate possessors to illegitimate possessors, either within the nation or internationally.
In all of that scenario, is there any way that "marking" new production military small arms is helpful?
8. To adopt where they do not exist and enforce all the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.
Section 8 is most unclear. Is the writer trying to say that the "necessary measures" are new national laws, or national police enforcement, or actions taken by U.N. government-employed administrators, or what? Regardless of which of those is the intent, none are likely to cope with illegal shipments of illegal military small arms for as long as we continue to live in a smuggler's paradise.
Containers have changed the world. With relative ease, a smuggler can put anything into a container and ship it. The container is virtually guaranteed not to be opened until it arrives in the destination country. On arrival, over 98 per cent of all containers will be sent forward to the consignee without internal examination. Therefore, the loss rate for shipments of contraband is well under 2 per cent. This is just a minor cost of doing business.
Given that the profit on an illegal shipment and sale of military small arms averages over 100 per cent, Section 8 is not a significant deterrent to criminals engaged in such activities.
9. To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their jurisdiction. These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities.
Section 9 is apparently about as futile as the rest of the proposals scanned to this point. Criminal gangs, bribed officials, and rogue governments cannot be persuaded to keep "comprehensive and accurate records" for "as long as possible" on their "manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons." Such records as they do keep are most unlikely to be "organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities."
It is very necessary to realize that the illicit shipping and stockpiling of military small arms is a criminal activity and should be treated and dealt with as a criminal activity. Attempting to deal with this problem administratively is futile.
This section is often used as a method of persuasion to enact severe gun control laws within a nation. Here are some relevant insights on that subject:
Throughout the world, there is need for a major effort to regain government recognition of the fact that citizens need firearms to protect human life from criminal violence. Current scientific research clearly proves that severe gun control laws do not reduce violent crime rates. They increase violent crime rates.
More and more, wherever such laws have been tried as a method of reducing violent crime levels, they are now seen to be failures--with no visible good effects, and very costly to administer. Canada, the area this writer is most familiar with, has been trying this route since 1978. Canadian media news reports are full of stories about violent crime, and increasing violent crime rates, which are now higher than violent crime rates (on a per capita basis) in the United States. Canadians are becoming more and more worried about rising levels of violent crime. This is creating a favourable climate in which to look for alternative solutions.
The British government has long pursued a policy of reducing violent crime by imposing more and more severe restrictions on Britain's law-abiding firearms owners. In the British government's theory, taking firearms away from the law-abiding reduces the number of firearms in the country, which reduces the number of firearms available to violent criminals, which reduces the number of violent crimes per year. British firearms control laws affect the entire nation. Protection of human life from criminal violence by private citizens has traditionally been regarded as something to be stamped out, leaving everything in this area to the police.
The United States pursued a similar policy from 1964 to about 1990, both federally and state by state. Most American firearms control laws are state laws, but a few are federal laws affecting the entire nation. The American system seems to improve the evolution of such laws, as individual American states can study the actual effects of their own laws in comparison to the actual effects of law changes in their neighbouring states. They can then adjust their own laws accordingly.
Between 1968 (when the first major federal gun control law was imposed) and 1990, violent crime levels in the U.S. increased sharply. Beginning in 1990, some states began trying a different pattern of laws. The key to success in reducing violent crime levels turned out to be the mandatory concealed carry permit law, while the earlier severe gun control laws, federal and state by state, produced only increases in violent crime levels.
One state, and one only, imposed no firearms control laws at all--ever. It is still the only state where a resident of the state can go into a sporting goods store, buy a handgun and ammunition, load the handgun, put it in his pocket, and walk out into the street without breaking any laws. Which state? Vermont--a very popular tourist destination, and a state with strikingly low violent crime rates.
Laws in other states used to feature the possibility that a resident could apply for, and perhaps get, a concealed carry permit that would authorize him or her to carry a concealed handgun. In some states, getting one was easy; in others, it was made very difficult by the authorities authorized to issue permits or refuse to issue them. Frequently, only those with "connections" could get such a permit.
From 1964 to 1990, with violent crime levels constantly rising, more and more people applied for concealed carry permits. Most were refused.
The U.S. being the kind of country it is, the people who were refused banded together as political activists. Those activists pressed for the removal of the bureaucrats' power to refuse to issue without being able to cite reasonable grounds for such a refusal. They were successful.
Laws were changed, and the new laws made it mandatory to issue the concealed carry permit. It had to be issued to anyone with a clean record, demonstrated proficiency in the handling and use of handguns, and demonstrated knowledge of the laws. To get such a permit, the applicant had to demonstrate adequate knowledge of what a person with a concealed handgun legally could and could not do with it.
The British theory is that crime control is the business of the police--exclusively. The American theory is that crime control is the business of the police and any member of the general public who has a clean record. If such a person chooses to take the training necessary to allow him or her to demonstrate proficiency in the handling and use of handguns and demonstrate knowledge of the relevant laws, the authorities must issue the concealed carry permit, making him or her a vital part of law enforcement.
The first such laws were the subject of vilification by the anti-gun lobbyists. They said such laws would turn the streets into bloodbaths. People with handguns would murder each other, pull guns over fender-benders, and generally behave in a wildly criminal fashion. That did not happen. Instead, those carefully screened people who applied for and got such permits turned out to be very careful and very law-abiding indeed. They committed virtually no crimes of any kind, but the impact of their presence on the street turned out to be immense. Unable to tell which potential victim was carrying a concealed handgun, violent criminals apparently became afraid of all potential victims--and avoided them. The criminals turned to non-confrontational crimes, such as burglary of unoccupied premises.
In every state that enacted a mandatory concealed-carry law, violent crime rates went down--immediately, sharply, and apparently permanently.
So--what are the actual effects of laws based on the British theory and the American theory, as opposed to the anticipated effects, now that we have had a few years to study them?
In the U.S., the latest FBI annual report statistics showed that the overall national violent crime rate for 2004 had decreased for the thirteenth consecutive year (starting in 1991), and had reached a 30-year low. As a check, the latest Bureau of Justice statistics showed that the overall national violent crime rate had reached a 32-year low in 2004.
The FBI data also show that in 2004, murder rates hit a 39-year low, robbery rates a 37-year low, and aggravated assault rates a 20-year low. All forms of violent crime have been steadily decreasing since 1991. Between 1991 and 2004, violent crime declined by 39 per cent, murder by 44 per cent, rape by 24 per cent, robbery by 50 per cent, and aggravated assault by 33 per cent.
Those are very good numbers, and the period from 1991 to 2004 has also been one with a steadily increasing number of states that feature mandatory concealed carry laws. Additionally, the American approach has been particularly good for women, as women are the preferred (even if not the most numerous) targets of violent criminals. Knowing that some women are able to protect human life from criminal violence has had a noticeable effect, reducing crimes against women. Causing violent criminals to fear women results in a desirable check on violent crime rates, as Paxton Quigley says in her excellent book, Armed and Female .
The British picture is quite different.
The British Home Office Statistical Bulletin, "Crime in England and Wales, 2004/2005," tells us that their national violent crime rate increased by 109 per cent from 1995 to 2004/2005.
Between 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, reports of "threat or conspiracy to murder" went up by 31 per cent in the "top nine [police] forces (those that did the best reporting)" and up 3 per cent in "other forces." Less serious woundings reports went up 25 per cent from the top nine and 12 per cent from the other forces. Possession of weapons reports went up 13 per cent from the top nine and 0 per cent from the other forces. Harassment reports went up 58 per cent in the top nine and 22 per cent in the other forces. Reports of sexual offences increased 17 per cent in 2004/2005, but this figure was confused by a change in the definition of "sexual offence" that occurred within the two reporting periods.
"Crime involving firearms" has been rising steadily since 1998/1999 recording period (more than doubling), in spite of the total "elimination" of handguns imposed by a total ban on the private ownership and possession of handguns in 1995. One conclusion is inescapable: British violent criminals are experiencing no difficulty in acquiring and using as many illegal handguns as they want.
Read those figures and draw your own conclusions. In this writer's view, the American approach is working, and the British idea is failing.
10. To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.
Section 10 is unrealistic. Certain nations have the capability and the desire to "ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the State and effective measures for tracing such weapons." The countries that have such a capability and desire are not the problem. The problems arise in countries what have either no "capability" or no "desire" to exert the effort and pay the price of being responsible for "all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the state."
11. To assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
Section 11 ignores the fact that the illicit trade in military small arms is a criminal activity, engaged in by criminals. Criminals do not make "applications for export authorizations." Therefore, nations cannot "assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law."
The opportunities for acquiring obsolete or obsolescent military small arms illegally from corrupt officials in the poorer nations exist. Adding administrative requirements will not stop such military small arms from disappearing from government storage facilities until all persons in charge of such arms are both honest and very well paid.
The nations affected are unable or unwilling to "establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons."
The "national system," even if it exists, will not in any way affect illegal shipments by criminals, because the criminals do not operate within the legitimate channels in which such restrictions can be applied. They do not fill out applications, the shipments are not described on the paperwork as military small arms, etc., etc.
12. To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons, including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures.
Section 12 is, again, an attempt to control criminal activity by administrative procedures. It is marginally useful where a major manufacturer is selling new military small arms to a government. It has little application where obsolete or obsolescent arms are being transferred to a group of rebels or terrorists, or a "liberation army" by a criminal gang or a rogue national government. It is the criminal activities that are the core of the problem.
Let us now examine a fully legal situation. A British firm developed the Sterling submachine gun (SMG, also called Machine Carbine, MC) . The earlier variants were called the Patchett, after the designer, and the later versions were called the Sterling, after the firm that manufactured it.
Sterling SMGs were also made in Canada for the Canadian armed forces, and in India for the Indian armed forces and for export.
Sterlings and Patchetts were sold to 113 nations in the years from 1951 to 1974; of those, 41 nations bought 500 or more of this type of submachine gun. The sales records from the period 1974 to 1989, when the Sterling firm disappeared, are lost.
Lost records are a major problem when trying to track illicit sales of military small arms. It seems probable that many such losses are deliberate.
Sterling's sales included guns made for the British government and the British armed forces [serial numbers prefixed with "UF (2-digit year) A"], and for the military and police forces of other nations, (serial numbers prefixed with No., KR, or S except for those serial-numbered to the order of the customer). Some sales were also purely commercial--sold at retail to civilians in nations where that was legal.
Sterling licenced the Indian government to produce Sterling SMGs, and sold 60,000 Sterling SMGs to the British Ministry of Supply for India. The Ministry of Supply intended to send those guns to India under an "Aid for India" contract, but shipments ceased in 1965 after 32,536 had been shipped as a result of the India-Pakistan war. This did not prevent the Indian government from going into production of Sterling SMGs in Kanpur (Cawnpore).
Many early sales were made to nations that Sterling could not get export permission to sell to in later years. Those nations often tried, later, to acquire more guns and spare parts from Sterling, but Sterling had to refuse where it could not get permission from the British government to export to them. Those nations then often bought their new guns and spare parts from India, which used its licence from Sterling to make Sterling submachine guns without paying royalties to Sterling.
Sterling submachine guns were also made in Canada for the Canadian armed forces, and by the British government factory at Fazakerley. The Fazakerley Sterlings have serial numbers prefixed with "UF (2-digit year) A."
The complications above form an abbreviated description of the licit transactions of one licit manufacturer and one type of licit military small arm. The writer has included them in order to illustrate how complex such matters are.
As one can see from the above, it is quite difficult to keep track of every gun produced of a given type, and it is both uneconomic and futile to try. The cost and effort required simply cannot be justified by the utility of the information in attempts to trace an illicit cargo of obsolete or obsolescent military small arms many years after the original production. Also, the original markings may have been destroyed by the criminals who are trafficking in them. If such markings ever did, in some unforeseeable way, become important, then removing them is a small and easy chore for illicit traffickers--but that will probably never be necessary.
13. To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices, without prejudice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have previously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.
Section 13 assumes that the "original exporting state" still has an interest in the fate of military small arms sold and exported long ago. It falsely assumes that the "original exporting state" can do anything about such a transaction under any bilateral agreement. It is, apparently, a pious wish and an exercise in futility.
14. To develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legislation or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities performed within the State’s jurisdiction and control.
Section 14 assumes that the criminals who "engage in small arms and light weapons brokering" can be drawn into this administrative scheme. It should be noted that such individuals and businesses are often taking payment for military small arms in the form of illicit diamonds or illicit drugs, and are therefore anxious to evade allgovernment scrutiny.
15. To take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Section 15 is very vague. The only "appropriate measures" are measures to convict and punish criminals who engage in illicit trading in military small arms. "Administrative means" are unlikely to have any effect, as the illicit dealers are operating outside the administrative structure, or are fully supported by their governments. In either of those two situations, use of "administrative means" runs into a stone wall.
16. To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons are destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.
Section 16 assumes that "registration" is an effective tool. It is not. Recently, the Canadian government tested its registration system. Of about 1,250,000 registered handguns, the test proved that over half of the registered firearms (about 660,000, or about 53 per cent) did not, in fact, exist. They were either accumulated administrative errors that resulted in two or more valid registration certificates being issued for the same firearm (quite common, for complex technical reasons), or , even more commonly, firearms registered to a person (at a registered location) who had moved, emigrated, or died. In either erroneous case, the registration certificate could no longer point to the firearm in question, to its location, or to the person who was in possession of it.
There is no known way to determine, from the registration certificate itself, whether the firearm is or is not at the location it is supposed to be, or whether it is still in the possession of the person supposed to be in possession of it.
Registration systems are also usually unable to uniquely identify a particular firearm with a particular registration certificate. That is because "unique identification" is much more difficult than it appears to be. Learned people write books about the details of "identifying" firearms. The Canadian system of registration, for example, cannot be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution if the defence attorney has access to even a modicum of expertise in this area. A particular registration certificate and a particular firearm cannot be connected with a degree of certainty that is beyond a reasonable doubt. "Reasonable doubt" is the standard used for admissibility of evidence in a Canadian court of criminal law.
17. To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss.
Section 17 assumes that even poor countries (where most of the problems erupt) have adequate facilities to provide sophisticated "appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss." This is not the case.
18. To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.
Section 18 assumes that both nations and individuals are willing and able to ignore the fact that significant numbers of obsolete or obsolescent military small arms represent a valuable asset that can be converted into cash, diamonds, or drugs. There is insufficient recognition of the fact that valuable assets always pose a temptation to those with authority over them to convert them illicitly into illicit cash, diamonds, or drugs. In some cases the illicit profits go to the government, and in others to individuals or companies. In some cases, the military small arms are certified as "destroyed" and in others certified as "lawfully sold to__________." Such certifications are often spurious, but it is often difficult to prove that.
19. To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated for destruction, taking into account, inter alia, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000.
Section 19 assumes that a certificate that such items have been destroyed is a guarantee that they have been. That is often not the case. They may be repairable, or have become valuable sources of spare parts, or be perfectly functional but no longer in the location where they are supposed to be. They are gone.
20. To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including, where appropriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
Section 20 ignores the fact that a person who possesses a military small arm for the protection of human life from criminal violence is very unlikely to give it up. He or she will keep it until the need to protect human life from criminal violence has actually diminished to a negligible risk level. Similarly, a person who possesses a military small arm for the purpose of changing the government of his or her nation is very unlikely to give it up until the government has actually been changed to a government that he or she approves. The Programme of Action is, too often, the world as seen by an unrealistic person who lives in a free and stable society.
21. To develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, unless another form of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons have been marked and the alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to include, where applicable, specific provisions for these programmes in peace agreements.
Section 21 assumes that all conflicts will eventually become "post-conflict situations," and that such situations will be so stable and peaceful and crime-free that ordinary citizens will cooperate with "collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons." It also assumes that the government (or the new government, if the rebels won) will handle the valuable arms collected after the conflict in ways that result in their destruction, rather than in their sale into the next area of conflict.
22. To address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular the reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropriate rehabilitation.
Section 22 describes a realistic goal for the United Nations, and an exercise in which U.N. participation and leadership are very valuable.
23. To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that impact on the prevention, combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international organizations and in accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia, (a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition that can contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Section 23 does not inspire this writer with confidence. Severe firearms control laws do not reduce violent crime levels. In every country where they have been tried, they have had the opposite effect. Such laws are very good at disarming the law-abiding citizens, and a flat failure at disarming violent criminals, who disobey them. By disarming the law-abiding, they increase the power of the violent criminal population and provide a guarantee of personal safety to the criminals. That effect (aggravating the violent crime levels in every category, not just "gun crime") is very visible in Britain, Canada, and Australia today. It also appeared in the United States, during their flirtation with severe firearms control laws (1964-1990), and was reversed there when firearms control laws were eased to a remarkable degree (1990-2006). In particular, when 38 U.S. states enacted mandatory concealed handgun carry laws in recent years, each such law reduced confrontational violent crime levels by startling percentages--swiftly and apparently permanently.
The lesson of the U.S. experience seems to corroborate the insurance analysis in this writer's preamble. Good people do not shoot at each other simply because a firearm is available. This is a rather simple lesson, and it should be learned.
At the regional level:
24. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact within subregional and regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.
This writer suggests that this is a police function, not an administrative function.
25. To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them.
Again, this writer suggests that handing this matter over to the police is far more likely to have good effects than trying to deal with it through administrative measures.
26. To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed by the States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or subregions on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or action programmes and cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures.
This writer suggests that Section 26 is an attempt to deal inappropriately with very real and very important situations by removing the tools of conflict from areas of conflict. It is, this writer suggests, far too late to apply that remedy. The military small arms are already there. They are likely to stay there for as long as the average possessor of a military small arm thinks that he or she needs one to protect human life from criminal violence, to earn a living as a violent criminal, or to overthrow an unpopular government. Once the unhappy situation (whatever it is that has forced an average citizen to arm himself or herself) has been rectified, then it is possible to reduce armament levels--not before.
27. To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.
Section 27 ignores the fact that the advent of containers has made all types of smuggling both very easy and very profitable. The real need is to find a way for customs officials and law enforcement officers to deal with containers.
28. To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional action on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.
Here, again, is the fallacy that severe gun control laws can reduce such problems. There is no evidence that they can, and much evidence that they make the problems worse by disarming the law-abiding majority and leaving all the guns in the hands of the criminals. In today's world, anything for which there is a high-price demand will be delivered. Anywhere.
29. To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard.
Section 29 ignores the fact than many of the smaller and poorer nations are simply unable to pay for sophisticated management and security.
30. To support, where appropriate, national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.
Section 30 is very appropriate, and a valuable service that is appropriate to U.N. functioning. It ignores, however, the difficulties involved in reaching a "post-conflict situation." That requires the removal of the causes of upset and dispute.
31. To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Section 31 ignores the fact that criminal activity cannot be treated with "measures to enhance transparency." Criminals are always hard at work in darkness, and object to light that exposes their activities. Applying "transparency" to criminal activity is impossible.
At the global level:
32. To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the effective implementation of arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Section 32 is more of a pious wish than a realistic goal. Throughout history, governments have aided groups in other countries who are trying to change their country of residence in a way that the assisting government sees as beneficial to the assisting governments. That is unlikely to change.
33. To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within existing resources, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action.
Section 33 is laudable, but this writer fears that it contemplates the reporting of only the activities of legitimate transactions in the firearms and ammunition field. The information needed is information about criminal transactions, most particularly including the transactions that result in legitimate military small arms being shifted into illegal status by illegal transfers to persons who should not have them, smuggled shipments of such arms, and other such transactions. Of the reports that this writer has so far studied, none have dealt with criminal shipments.
34. To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, including providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this section, of collected small arms and light weapons.
This writer regards section 34 as laudable. However, the problem remains: how does one arrive at the "post-conflict situation" in which this is possible? The Programme of Action is remarkably silent on that question.
35. To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.
Section 35 does not, in this writer's opinion, take account of the difficulties involved in disarming individuals who still see a necessity to protect human life from criminal violence, even in a "disarmament, demobilization and reintegration" and "peacekeeping operations" situation. Further, this section seems to consider the disarmament of everyone as a desirable thing. That is incorrect. It is much more difficult to disarm those who are criminals than it is to disarm those who are basically law-abiding. If the law-abiding are disarmed, the criminals are much more powerful because they have not been disarmed. The law-biding become preferable victims when they turn in their firearms, and that exacerbates the problems. It does not cure them; it makes them worse.
It is not wise to guarantee the safety of a violent criminal by disarming his victim, and then telling him that his victim has been disarmed. It is wiser to ensure that the violent criminal goes in fear that his victim may be able to protect human life from criminal violence.
36. To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.
Section 36 is very unrealistic. The world is awash in military small arms that are the obsolescent discards of nations that have moved on to newer and more sophisticated military small arms. Those arms flow across national borders in containers that are documented as containing innocuous commercial goods. Any attempt to deal with that situation by way of the paperwork connected to the container or to the arms themselves is almost always futile. Identifying an AK-47 as having once been issued to a soldier in the Romanian armed forces does not help if the military small arm has since been transferred twice legally, and six times illegally. There are no such records, anyway.
37. To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as well as other relevant organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to proceed against them in accordance with their national laws.
Section 37 is one of the few useful ideas in this Programme of Action. Unfortunately, the World Customs Organization is unlikely to have much information about smuggled military small arms, because there are no relevant documents submitted to Customs. The documentation "identifies" the goods in the containers as licit commercial shipments.
The identification of Interpol as a key player is encouraging, but the emphasis on this vital point is lacking, as is any recommendation to increase both the funding and staffing of Interpol--both of which are required if any success is to be had.
38. To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime.
Section 38 is mildly useful, except where the national government or an agency of it is complicit in the illegal transactions. However, it should be noted that most "international legal instruments" affect only perfectly legal shipments of sporting rifles and shotguns--which are not the problem.
39. To develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.
Section 39 is quite important, because it recognizes that the problem lies in the "illicit brokering" of military small arms, and not in the licit trade in military small arms generally. Such "illicit brokering" is a criminal activity that cannot be dealt with by administrative procedures. This problem belongs in the hands of Interpol, not in the hands of administrators.
40. To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to facilitate the appropriate cooperation of civil society, including nongovernmental organizations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in this area.
Section 40's attempt to "encourage the relevant international and regional organizations" to pay close heed to "nongovernmental organizations" is very dangerous. Unfortunately, many of the strongly interested "nongovernmental organizations" lack knowledge and experience in the military small arms field, and their advice and ideas are frequently counter-productive. While some "nongovernmental organizations" are deeply involved in military small arms matters, few of them have any knowledge or experience relevant to the smuggling and illicit trafficking of obsolescent military small arms that are the core of the problems.
41. To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society.
Section 41 is unclear. Is it recommending the dissemination of accurate information from police and other relevant sources in nations where the problem exists, or the dissemination of inaccurate information from NGOs in nations where the problem does not exist?
III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance
1. We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that the primary responsibility for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.
2. States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, subregional and national levels and to encourage the establishment and strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions.
If Section 2 is referring to international cooperation in policing operations, it is useful. If it is referring to some sort of administrative solution that will attempt to identify and trace smuggled criminal shipments of military small arms, it is of marginal utility. Sweeping generalizations of this type are rarely useful.
3. States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.
Does Section 3, when it mentions "small arms funds," mean that "appropriate international and regional organizations" should supply small and poor nations with funds to buy more military small arms? That would render their existing supplies of military small arms obsolete and throw them on the market. This is unclear.
4. States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the affected States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes.
Section 4's final point, "including by addressing their root causes," is, in this writer's opinion, the single most important thing in that Section. However, before "addressing their root causes" can be done, it is necessary to identify those root causes by scientific analysis. Any such analysis that begins with the words, "Of course," or "It is obvious that" should be treated with deep suspicion. There are far too many people currently involved in this area who are reasoning from a conclusion--a practice that very rarely gives rise to any good effects.
There is much too much good-hearted consensus in this area, consensus not based on scientific research. When one does rigorously objective scientific research, the results are rarely the results one expected.
For example, Dr. B. S. Centerwall's paper, "Exposure to Television as a Risk Factor for Violence," American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 129, No. 4, April 1989, made a strong case for considering exposure to television programming as a factor that increased the homicide rates in countries where television appeared and then grew to the saturation point in the society.
His concepts have been augmented by recent research into mirror neurons. Recent advances have allowed scientists to watch brain activity in living subjects, and their research has turned up the fact that mirror neutrons act in the brain to give an observer more detailed information about what he is observing. An observer experiences what he is observing as if he was the person doing what he is observing. It seems likely, therefore, that observing many murders and other acts of violence on television had the effect of inuring the observers--particularly children--to the personal experience of committing violent assaults and murders, increasing the violent crime rates.
Concatenating from that, modern video games are frequently shockingly violent. The person playing the game is often using a simulated gun or other weapon to destroy human individual after human individual, "killing" many people in a few hours of "play." If the above analyses are correct, we can expect major increases in violent crime rates as a direct result of violent video games.
5. States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, cooperate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
6. With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and international and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested States, upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appropriate legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection and exchange of information.
This writer submits that the Programme of Action's emphasis on "tracing and marking" is misplaced. The military small arms in question are out there, and in circulation. Tracing them back to a point of origin is very likely to embarrass the government that originally issued them to its armed forces as new military small arms.
Tracing them back that far is probably an unproductive and useless exercise, unless the U.N. intends to punish that government for allowing the military small arms to enter the illicit marketplace.
If no punishment is intended or possible, why waste resources on a futile exercise?
7. States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Section 7 is the administrative "solution." It assumes that by when all types of administrator are together into one room, a discussion by hundreds of administrators, each certain of his own good sense, will produce the optimum solution.
That is not the case.
8. Regional and international programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate international or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this area.
Section 8 is, this writer submits, merely a pious wish. Many nations simply lack the necessary technical capabilities, staff, and record-keeping abilities to prevent stockpiles of obsolescent or obsolete military small arms from entering the illicit marketplace. Yes, they can be helped by the developed nations--but can the help be effective? This writer doubts that the developed nations will want to send guards to every warehouse full of obsolescent arms in the threatened nations, or that the owners of those arms will welcome those foreign guards.
9. States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate, including by providing relevant information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol’s International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database that may be developed for this purpose.
Section 9 is, in this writer's opinion, extremely useful. There is a crying need for better intelligence, because it is only through intelligence that shipments can be intercepted and stockpiles found.
10. States are encouraged to consider international cooperation and assistance to examine technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technologies.
What is needed, in this writer's opinion, is more commitment to police solutions and less dependence on unrealistic administrative solutions. Criminals do not keep or maintain detailed records.
11. States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.
Section 11 is unrealistic. Nations that are complicit, either by direct government action or by actions by government agents or agencies, in the illicit trafficking in military small arms, are more likely to cover up their complicity than cooperate. Therefore, this is, and probably always will be, a matter best dealt with by police operations. It is, after all, a criminal activity.
12. States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national marking systems on small arms and light weapons.
To what end? If the supplying of military small arms to people who should not have them is the problem, then what, precisely, is the advantage of knowing the nation of origin? Unless the U.N. is seriously proposing punishment of the nation of origin, the information is useless, and it is usually so old that it is no longer relevant to a current criminal investigation. Section 12 is part and parcel of the administrative mindset that this writer sees in the entire Programme of Action.
13. States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to enhance, according to their respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Section 13 is, in this writer's opinion, valuable. International cooperation in policing is difficult, due to the variation in what is illegal in different countries. Police task forces are formed when spectacular crimes are committed (international bombings, art thefts, etc.) but they are usually disbanded after the specific case is finished. There is a need for a continuous international cooperation group at Interpol, integrated with the national police in nations.
14. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks of unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.
It should be noted that Section 14 is describing the destruction of a valuable asset. A poor country may want to realize some of that value, and a poorly paid individual in charge of such a surplus stock may well see an opportunity for personal gain. This should be approached with caution and good sense.
15. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Section 15 should also include the illicit trade in illicit drugs and diamonds and art, because illicit drugs and diamonds and art are all frequently exchanged for illicit military small arms. The smuggling of illicit drugs, illicit diamonds, illicit art, and illicit military small arms are frequently linked in ways that are not exchanges of one for another. This should be recognized.
16. Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional and international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.
Section 16 should not ignore the necessity for reducing the need to protect human life from criminal violence in the aftermath of conflict. Unless attention is paid to that requirement, disarming is in conflict with the need the person in possession f the firearm has to protect human life from criminal violence.
17. With regard to those situations, States should make, as appropriate, greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account existing and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the rights of the States concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.
Section 17 is, in this writer's opinion, very valuable. Until a poor or post-conflict nation has stabilized to the degree necessary for rendering protection of human life from criminal violence unnecessary, removal of military small arms from the society is impossible.
18. States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Section 18 is valuable, provided that such research is realistic. Certain NGOs apparently believe that research should start from a conclusion and spend time and effort trying to prove that conclusion. Research conducted in that manner has little or no value.
IV. Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly the following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Conference:
(a) To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly;
It should be noted that very little progress and virtually no discernible successes have resulted from the Programme of Action. This writer suggests that it concentrates far too much on (i) identification and tracing, (ii) identification of the nation of origin, (iii) legitimate production and shipments of sporting firearms, and (iv) administrative measures. It also pays too little heed to the necessity for police involvement (national and international) in dealing with the illicit trafficking in military small arms.
(b) To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action;
(c) To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons;
To what end? The ability to "identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons" is largely irrelevant unless the intent is to punish the nation responsible for allowing its obsolete or obsolescent military small arms to enter the illicit marketplace. For example, such a trace would have proved that the Libyan AK-47 assault rifles supplied to the IRA by Libya came originally from Romania, where they were manufactured. What would be the utility of having that information, when the illicit shipment was shipped from Libya and consigned to the IRA? Does the U.N. intend to punish Romania? If it does not, the information is utterly useless.
(d) To consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.
2. Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:
(a) Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action;
(b) Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in their implementation of the Programme of Action;
(c) Further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action.
Summary: Within a nation, severe gun controls, a firearms registry, and firearms transfer controls are items that have no effect on the guns owned, used, and rented by confrontational criminals (the violent criminals who choose to confront their victims). That is because they do not apply for a firearm licence, do not buy guns from legitimate sources, do not register their guns, and do not apply for a permit to carry an illegal handgun down to the bank to rob it. As a result, such a gun control system requires heavy expenditures in tax dollars; no known gun control system succeeds in funding itself by any known fee system. The promised "reduction in violent crime levels" just does not happen.
The negative effects of a severe gun control system include:
1. The removal of all or most firearms from the hands of victims, and the failure to remove any firearms from the hands of violent criminals.
2. The inability of the system to point to the name, address, or identification of the gun of the violent criminal because none of these data are in the system.
3. The criminal's perception of the system as offering him (the criminal) protection while he is committing any violent confrontational crime. The system has either confiscated the firearm owned by the victim, persuaded the victim to stop owning a firearms, or forced the victim to lock up his firearm separately from the ammunition. All of those effects are highly desirable from the viewpoint of the criminal, because they make it safer for him to rape, rob, or murder.
4. Severe damage to the interests of women. Women are the preferred targets of violent criminals, as the criminal believes that a woman is less likely to be able to protect human life from criminal violence during the inevitable period of time between the beginning of the crime and the arrival of the police (usually after the criminal has left the scene, because there was no way she could call the police any earlier). As Cindy Lightheart wrote in her excellent "Women in Danger ," Canadian Firearms Journal Volume XV, No. 4:
"The police do not come to a woman before or during a violent crime. They come after the crime has been completed and the violent criminal has left the scene. It is extremely rare for a police officer to arrive in time to prevent or even interrupt a violent crime when a woman is the victim. How could he? She could not call the police before her attacker left.
"Given that truth, it is vitally necessary for a woman in danger to have the right and the ability to protect herself and her children when the attack begins. If she cannot protect herself, the police will not be there to protect her, and she will be just another headline.
"Allowing a law-abiding woman, who has met all the qualifications and standards required of an RCMP constable and has no criminal record, to have the ability to protect herself does not make her a menace to society. Issue her an authorization so that she can carry a handgun for protection of human life from criminal violence. Then the mere fact that she exists is enough to spread a blanket of protection over all women, because a violent criminal does not and cannot know when his chosen victim will be able to protect herself from his attack.
"The law allows the issuance of such authorizations, but the federal and provincial bureaucrats refuse to issue them--and that is illegal. A bureaucrat can say no, but he is only a decision-maker, not a lawmaker. He has no legal right to reject all applications!
"Of course, there will be few such women, because the training required takes time, money, and effort. But if a violent criminal does not know which woman is carrying a handgun, he will be deterred from attacking any woman.
"You think that's ridiculous? In Orlando, Florida, in 1966, the rape rate was very high. Therefore police began to train women in the safe handling and use of handguns. The rape rate fell from 36 per year in 1966 to 4 per year in 1967. And it stayed down. That was not because the women were shooting anyone. They weren't. It was because major publicity said that some of them could--and might! We need that protection for Canadian women."
Internationally, the sort of enhanced paperwork control proposed by the Programme of Action is equally futile. The illicit transfers of obsolete and obsolescent military firearms are being done by criminal gangs, or by overt or covert action by national governments, or through the illegal activities of corrupt officials of a national government.Therefore, although the severe controls look good on the surface, they have no chance of dealing with actual illicit transfers of military small arms and light weapons, because such shipments do not go through legitimate channels. The firearms are either illegally smuggled, or corruptly placed on a deceptive manifest. In either case, what is needed is much-improved international police intelligence work, improved international police cooperation, and permanent multinational police teams established to deal with this form of international crime.
At present, multinational police teams are formed to deal with a specific crime that has international implications, such as the theft of a major work of art. After the crime has been dealt with, that team is dissolved--but what is needed for international crime (particularly illicit shipments of small arms and light weapons) is a permanent, well funded, properly staffed, multinational team that is not dissolved.